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In January 2020 when I first read Nigeria’s Finance Act 2019, one of the instinctive questions
that came to me was “is Nigeria serious about taxing digital trade now”? There were a few
reasons for this skepticism. First, the Act seeks to tax nonresident companies (NRCs) that
have a “significant economic presence” (SEP) in Nigeria but then delegates the definition of
that pivotal phrase. Second, I questioned how Nigeria can enforce/administer this unilateral
tax, which is payable by companies outside its borders. Third, I imagined that Nigeria’s
unilateral attempt to tax digital trade could undermine relations with a strategic economic,
and political partner, the US. Nigeria has now crossed the first hurdle of defining SEP – no
doubt, a meaningful step forward – yet, there remains much to process before Africa’s
biggest economy can begin to milk the digital cow.
Nigeria is in the middle of extensive tax reform. Shortfalls in revenue, underscored by the
country’s ultra-low tax-to-GDP ratio and humongous debt profile, as well as a longstanding
need to diversify the economy from petroleum exports, are some of the drivers of reform.
One of the most pronounced reforms introduced by the Finance Act borders on the taxation
of digital trade. Section 4 of the Finance Act amends the Companies Income Tax Act (CITA)
by introducing a new paragraph 13(2)(c). By that new provision, an NRC is liable to tax in
Nigeria if it conducts business in Nigeria through electronic means (such as the transmission
of sounds, signals, images, data) to the extent that the company has an SEP in Nigeria and
profit can be attributed to the NRC’s activities in Nigeria. The businesses contemplated
include ecommerce, streaming/downloading services, data collection/transmission service,
cab hire services, and advertising.
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Further, the Finance Act introduces a new paragraph 13(2)(e) of CITA, by which nonresident
technical, management, consultancy or professional services are liable to tax in Nigeria if
they serve a Nigerian resident, to the extent that the service provider has an SEP in Nigeria.
The recently issued Companies Income Tax (Significant Economic Presence) Order 2020
now provides the missing definition. As part of the definition, an NRC is deemed to have an
SEP in Nigeria if its digital trade activities earn a turnover or income of ₦25,000,000
($65,000). The Order anticipates that localized advertising and use of domain name will also
qualify as SEP, without any revenue threshold. There is also no revenue threshold for
paragraph 13(2)(e) of CITA. These measures are designed to operate pending the
conclusion of ongoing multilateral deliberations on the formulation of digital tax rules.
The new CITA rules try to adapt Nigeria’s tax framework to the reality of modern business,
which is that so much is done and earned digitally and remotely nowadays; i.e. without the
need for a physical presence in the country where income is derived. The new rules also
have significant implications for both international tax and international trade relations. Taxing
NRCs without a physical nexus represents a fundamental shift from subsisting international
tax rules/conventions on allocation of taxing powers between states. The current rules, which
are under review, typically require the existence of a physical presence in the taxing country,
usually termed a “permanent establishment” (PE), for the taxation of the business profits of
an NRC. So, in context, unilateral measures, such as Nigeria’s (which try to bypass the
traditional PE rule), while assertive of a state’s sovereignty, may, regardless, contravene
international convention or even legally binding pacts, where there is a double taxation treaty
(DTT).
There is broad opinion that the existing international rules – designed a century ago – are no
longer fit for purpose. These opinions target the unfair distribution of taxing rights among
states as well as the present digital trade/tax conundrum. Many agree that there is need to
adjust the subsisting rules in the light of radical digitalization that has, in many cases, created
room for the misalignment of value creation with tax obligation. One of the tax consequence
of the present situation, for Nigeria, is that multinational NRCs typically avoid operational or
investment structures that result in the creation of a PE in Nigeria when they are providing
digital goods or services. The OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS leads the
multilateral efforts to adjust the rules. Nigeria is a participant. International tax rules are
typically the product of political bargain (such as the OECD is trying to strike) but when
bargaining struggles or fails to produce the required consensus, there is a risk of pervasive
unilateralism. It is no surprise, therefore, that, in the face of protracted OECD deliberations,
further hampered by the COVID-19 pandemic, Nigeria is just one of many countriesseeking
to tax nonresident digital businesses. The US, the home state of many of the most powerful
players in the digital trade space – Amazon, Apple, Google, Microsoft, Facebook, etc. –
sternly opposes any such unilateral tax measures, while approaching multilateral efforts with
some degree of resentment. The US asserts exclusive sovereignty to tax its digital
companies, regardless of where they profit, and has severally expressed willingness to go to
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trade war with any country, including some of its closest allies (the UK and France, for
instance), over the issue. The US only recently pulled out of the OECD-led talks citing an
impasse in reaching a deal.
US-Nigeria relations
Unlike countries such as the UK and France, Nigeria does not have a DTT with the US, so,
technically, there are no legal constraints on Nigeria applying an expanded definition of
“taxable presence” in its tax code in a way that taxes U.S. corporations digitally operating in
Nigeria. There are, however, ecopolitical factors that make it incumbent on Nigeria to thread
with caution, and, perhaps, await a multilateral solution.
The US is a close and critical ally of Nigeria’s and one of the largest foreign investors in the
African country. The world’s most powerful economy has reemerged as a big buyer of
Nigeria’s oil, an export that is critical to Nigeria’s survival. Apart from trade, the US provides
Nigeria both military and non-military aid. In addition, Nigerians living in the US remit billions
of dollars yearly in much needed cash. In seeking to enforce the new rules, Nigeria risks
impacting its relationship with a much more powerful counterpart. There are palpable signs
that the US is not shy to redress its relations with Nigeria if it feels dissatisfied. During the
Jonathan-Obama era, the U.S. imposed a “Leahy Law” arms sale restriction on Nigeria for
gross human rights violations allegedly committed by Nigeria’s armed forces in the war
against Boko Haram. Relations were again briefly strained in January 2020, resulting in the
US imposing a visa ban on Nigeria. Standing beside his Nigerian counterpart, US Secretary
of State, Mike Pompeo, made sure to stress US investment in Nigeria and the two countries’
strategic economic, political and military relations when addressing the visa issue. It is,
perhaps, merely coincidental that this strain escalated just after President Buhari signed the
Finance Act. So far, only the powerful EU bloc – or some members of that bloc – has shown
any resolve to enter the ring with the U.S. over this issue. It is hard to think that Nigeria
would assert itself that far given its relatively much weaker capacity to stomach and respond
to a US reprisal. A potential US backlash against Nigeria is not so much anchored on the
prospect that the Nigerian tax will significantly hurt the bottomline of US companies, but
rather that the US simply does not want anyone to think “we can do this.” The deterrent
approach reflects the point that “if the U.S. ‘lets’ Nigeria do it, why not others”?
Why now for Nigeria?
It seems that Nigeria is even more fiscally strained than it was in early 2020 when the
Finance Act was signed. Since then, the COVID-19 pandemic has ravaged the country’s
revenue projections, with oil markets in disarray. Recently, Nigeria’s President requested
approval from the National Assembly to borrow an additional $5.5 Billion. This is on the heels
of another request, in April, to borrow the sum of $2.36 Billion. At the same time, Nigeria is
passionately pleading with some international creditors to cancel some of the country’s
foreign debts, to help cushion the economic effects of the pandemic.
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In a rather bizarre twist, in April, the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) issued a circular
pleading with certain corporate bodies – Telcos, e-Commerce, Financial Institutions, etc. –
that were “experiencing boom” as a result of the pandemic to redeem their tax obligations
ahead of time. On 29 April 2020, the FIRS released a circular outlining the intention of the
government to commence implementation of provisions of the Stamp Duties Act that impose
stamp duty on electronic documents. The dutiable instruments or receipts mentioned in the
circular include electronic documents or files, emails, short message service, instant
messages, any internet-based messaging service, website, or cloud-based platform. With
such a vigorously displayed need for cash, it is easy to see why Nigeria is eager to tax digital
transactions. Moreover, by official projections, there are indications that investments in the
digital economy will generate up to $88 Billion and three million jobs for Nigerians before the
end of 2021.
Conclusion
The principle of administrability requires that a state imposes only a tax that it can administer
and collect. While any country can draft whatever it likes into its tax code, it is important that
a country only drafts what it can administer/enforce. By the language of the Finance Act, the
taxpaying NRC must have a “significant economic presence” in Nigeria and profits must be
attributable to that the company’s Nigerian activities. Legally speaking, Nigeria can only tax
where these criteria exist. Without bilateral or multilateral cooperation, it will be impracticable
for Nigeria to administer its digital tax law. Nigeria may need the aid of its counterparts –
financial institutions, as well – to track and collect the taxes. Although there are existing
cooperation and exchange of information agreements, it is arguable that those agreements
do not capture the tax regime that Nigeria is trying to impose. Thus, other countries may not
be obligated to disclose information on their corporations operating digitally in Nigeria.
Without information, it is difficult to tell what an NRC’s turnover is, not to mention how much
of that turnover qualifies as profit attributable to Nigeria, unless the FIRS invokes the
deemed profit option in section 30(1) of CITA.
Even where information is available, without mutual collection agreements with other
countries, Nigeria can still not collect. This may lead to a disruptive/non-neutral situation
where Nigeria is only able to enforce the law against companies that are voluntarily
cooperative or resident in cooperative countries. Imagine, just hypothetically, the
anticompetitive effect on streaming services of taxing Spotify (a Swedish enterprise) and
Deezer (a French enterprise) but not Apple or YouTube Music (American enterprises). If
Nigeria uses a deduction at source model, it is unlikely to capture enough of the tax base to
warrant the trouble, since most transactions contemplated are business-to-customer-based.
An alternative would be to work with the payment outlets to automate charges on business-
to-customer transactions and, perhaps, business-to-business transactions. Even then, the
NRCs may simply pass on the tax burden to their (aggrieved) Nigerian consumers, making it
look more like a consumption tax rather than a tax on income. It all seems like a lot of effort.
Yet, in that assertive endeavour, Nigeria risks straining some vital external relations that
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could have repercussions for the country in both economic and political respects. It is
possible that the fallout could even have more impact on Nigeria’s fiscal bottomline than the
revenue that Nigeria stands to raise from implementing the now incubating tax measure.
These staring practical and policy-based considerations drive me back to my new year
question: “is Nigeria serious about taxing digital trade now”?
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